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I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the most paramount of all fundamental freedoms is the
right to openly express oneself and engage in the exchange of ideas.
Because the right to open public discourse is the catalyst for transmitting new viewpoints and changing the social order, the right to
free speech has become a central tenet of American culture. To ensure that this crucial right was adequately protected, the framers
crafted the First Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people . . . to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances."1 At the time
James Madison drafted the First Amendment, he likely only intended to safeguard traditional means of exchange, such as print
and oral communication. However, the creation of the internet, by
generating new spaces for discourse, has consequently produced
novel types of speech that also warrant protection from governmental regulation.
According to recent data, the number of American adults using
the internet has steadily increased, rising from fifty-two percent in
2000 to eighty-eight percent in 2016.2 Today, much of American
internet communication takes place on online social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter. In fact, in the eyes of United
States Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan, "[e]verybody is on

1.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

2. Internet BroadbandFact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/.
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Twitter," and most Americans under thirty-five years old use Facebook to learn about current events.3 Not only are social media sites
highly effective tools for sharing photos, planning events, and connecting with old friends, but these networks also allow any person
with an internet connection to "become a town crier with a voice
that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. '4 In fact,
given the intense political polarization revolving around the most
recent 2016 presidential election, many Americans have taken advantage of their online voices to spread political messages, engage
in civic debate, and express concerns about the United States government. According to recent data, roughly one-third of American
users of social media websites "indicate they often ... or sometimes
• . . comment, discuss or post about government and politics . . .5

Obviously, the right to speak freely on the internet is not only important to communicate with friends and family about personal affairs, but as "the modern public square,"6 it is also crucial to the
state of American democracy.
Because the Supreme Court of the United States has fervently
defended freedom of speech throughout U.S. history, and has even
protected dialogue in cyberspace, most Americans have probably
never considered how governmental censorship of internet activity
could impact interpersonal communication and societal development. However, citizens of other nations deal with state control of
the internet on a daily basis, primarily the citizens of the People's
Republic of China.7 Since almost the beginning of web access in
China, the Chinese government has been fearful of the people's ability to instantly spread opposition to the Communist regime and potentially cause rebellion and political unrest.8 Due to this concern,

the Chinese government has utilized the building blocks of legal restriction, technological regulation, and scare tactics to construct an
indestructible barrier between its citizens and certain information

3.

Ephrat Livni, A US Supreme Court Discussion of Free Speech and Social Media Got

Comically Postmodern, QUARTZ (Mar. 3, 2017), https://qz.com/922444/a-us-supreme-court-

discussion-of-free-speech-and-social-media-got-comically-postmodern/.
4. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
5. Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, The PoliticalEnvironment on Social Media, PEW RES.
CTR. (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/10/25/political-content-on-social-me-

dia/.
6. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
7. See The Great Firewall of China, BLOOMBERG NEWS, https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/great-firewall-of-china (last updated Nov. 5, 2018, 9:36 PM) (noting that
at the advent of the Chinese internet, the Chinese government yielded the following sentiment: "When you open the window, the flies come in.").
8. See id.
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online.9 This barrier, commonly known as the "Great Firewall of
China," has successfully thwarted Chinese internet users' access to
web content, impeded their ability to freely converse with the online
global community, and totally eliminated a category of internet
speech valued by most Americans: online political discourse. 10
Although the inability to surf and post freely online is likely unimaginable to most Americans due to the First Amendment's role
as the backbone of American culture and government, the current
American leader, President Donald Trump, has not only tried to
prevent online criticism of his administration, but has also made
statements and taken actions that suggest the potential for governmental control of internet activity similar to that of China. 1 In fact,
one commentator noted, "[t]he view that the internet should be
open, interoperable, and free from state censorship has been a pillar
of American policy since the 1990s. Mr. Trump sharply departs
'12
from this establishment consensus.
Because open online discourse is tremendously important to both
U.S. citizens and to the modern American political process, comments and actions from the American leader about suppressing internet freedoms should raise concerns about the potential demolition of free online expression and the construction of America's own
"Great Firewall." In order to discuss whether there is a possibility
that the open and predominantly uncensored American cyberspace
could morph into a version similar to the heavily-monitored internet in China, this article will first discuss the current status of internet speech and governmental interference with online exchange
in both the United States and China. Then, after juxtaposing the
internet schemes in both nations, this article will explore President
Trump's recent attacks on internet speech and analyze their parallels with the Chinese government's construction of the Great Firewall of China. Finally, this article will assess whether there are
any viable avenues for the current administration to intrude upon
one of the most highly cherished rights in modern times: the freedom of speech online.
9. See Trina K. Kissel, Note, License to Blog: Internet Regulation in the People's Republic
of China, 17 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 229, 231-33 (2007).
10. See Jennifer Shyu, Comment, Speak No Evil: Circumventing Chinese Censorship, 45
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 225, 227 (2008).
11. See, e.g.,
Sean Lawson, The Law That Could Allow Trump To Shut Down The US
Internet, FORBES (Dec. 2, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/seanlawson/2016/12/02/the-law-that-could-allow-trump-to- shut-down-the-u-s-internet/#38e353f84
dac.
12. Id. (quoting Timothy Edgar, Opinion:Donald Trump's Troubling Internet, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/PasscodeVoices/20 16/1117/Opinion-Donald-Trump-s-troubling-internet).
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THE JOURNEY TO FREE INTERNET SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES

Since its debut in the 1980s, 13 the internet has experienced extraordinary growth, reaching over three billion users worldwide in
2015.14 In the United States, along with the internet's climbing
popularity came struggle and debate over how to protect this vehicle for dialogue with "anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to
the Internet" from governmental intrusion. 15 When dealing with
this novel legal issue, the Supreme Court of the United States has,
unsurprisingly, fervently defended internet expression while also
retaining limitations conventionally imposed on more traditional
methods of speech.16 In fact, the Supreme Court has safeguarded
17
even the most explicit materials, such as online pornography,
while only refusing to extend First Amendment protection on the
rare occasion that the online content at issue has no societal value,
18
such as when words invoke conflict or threat.
A.

Protectionof Explicit Materials

Although the earliest online speech cases dealt with an extremely
taboo topic-internet pornography-the Supreme Court determined that the importance of maintaining the time-honored tradition of protecting free speech far outweighed any need to censor controversial adult content online. 19 Because the inception of the internet allowed users to disseminate information around the globe
instantaneously for the first time, sexually explicit materials, such
20
as pornographic images, quickly found their place in cyberspace.
In response, Congress enacted two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) with the aim of shielding minors
navigating the web in the United States from "indecent" and "patently offensive" communications online.21 These two provisions
13.

Richard J. Zecchino, Could the Framers Have Ever Imagined? A Discussion on the

First Amendment and the Internet, 1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C. L. 981, 985 (1999).
14. Jacob Davidson, Here's How Many Internet Users There Are, MONEY (May 26, 2015),

http://money.com/money/3896219/internet-users-worldwide/.
15. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997).
16. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011-13 (2015) (recognizing that
while sharing thoughts and ideas is generally protected online, true threats made via the
internet are not protected by the First Amendment's guarantees).
17. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 673 (2004); Reno, 521
U.S. at 882.

18.
words
19.
20.
21.

See Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (holding that fighting
meant to incite a breach of peace are not protected by the First Amendment).
See Reno, 521 U.S at 882.
See id. at 853-54.
Id. at 849; 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d) (1996).

174

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 57

criminalized both the "knowing transmission of obscene or indecent
messages to any recipient under 18 years of age" and the "knowing
sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a manner
22
that is available to a person under 18 years of age" on the internet.
In the case of Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union decided in
1997, the Supreme Court of the United States had its first opportunity to grapple with the question of whether government regulation of internet expression violates the First Amendment when it
was called to determine the constitutionality of the "indecent trans23
mission" and "patently offensive display" provisions of the CDA.
In a unanimous decision, the Court concluded that the CDA provisions at issue were unconstitutional. 24 In its analysis, the Court
first determined that Congress rendered the CDA provisions vague
by failing to provide the differing meanings for "patently offensive"
and "indecent" in each provision, and that ambiguous statutes comprehensively regulating certain content, such as the provisions at
'25
issue, create an "obvious chilling effect on free speech.
Furthermore, in analyzing the constitutionality of the CDA provisions, the Court applied its most heightened level of review, strict
scrutiny, which requires legislation to be narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling government interest by the least restrictive means
possible. 26 After utilizing this test, the Court determined that, although sheltering children from harmful materials is a legitimate
and worthwhile government objective, the CDA provisions failed to
pass heightened judicial scrutiny because they "lack[ed] the precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regulates
the content of speech"27 and because there were less restrictive
means available to achieve the government's goal. 28 In other words,
because these two CDA provisions were not narrowly tailored to
achieve the goal of protecting minors, the provisions created a blanket restriction on all sexually explicit internet materials that would
unnecessarily burden and suppress "a large amount of speech that
adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one
29
another."

22.
23.
24.
25.

Reno,
Reno,
Id. at
Id. at

26.

See id. at 871, 882; see also Stephen C. Jacques, Comment, Reno v. ACLU: Insulating

521 U.S. at 859-60; 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d) (1996).
521 U.S. at 849.
882.
849, 871-72.

the Internet, The First Amendment, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 46 Am. U. L. REV. 1945,

1981-82 (1997).
27.
28.
29.

Reno, 521 U.S. at 874.
Id. at 879.
Id. at 874.
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Although to some this decision may only seem like the Supreme
Court's protection of the right to freely transmit sexual materials
online, the Court's holding in Reno had important and far-reaching
implications for all internet users and materials. For instance, this
case of first impression led the Court to recognize that "content on
the Internet is as diverse as human thought," and that creation of
and access to this content, even if it is "indecent" or "patently offensive" to a portion of the population, is a right protected by the First
Amendment. 30 Additionally, this decision marked the Court's first
recognition of the internet as a communication medium warranting
protection from governmental censorship and, in some cases, de31
manding the most stringent standard of judicial review.
A few years after Reno, in the case of Ashcroft v. American Civil
Liberties Union, the Court encountered a congressional enactment
similar to the CDA, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), and
had yet another opportunity to apply heightened scrutiny to internet regulations and renew its commitment to staunchly safeguarding internet expression. 32 In response to the Court's decision in
Reno, Congress made its second attempt to make the internet safe
for minors by enacting COPA, which imposed penalties of a $50,000
fine and six months' imprisonment for knowingly posting content
that is "harmful to minors" on the internet for "commercial purposes." 33 In determining whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit correctly enjoined the enforcement of
COPA, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny review and determined that, because the legislation would suppress constitutionally-protected internet speech, the Government had the burden of
showing that "the challenged regulation is the least restrictive
means among available, effective alternatives. ' 34 The Government,
however, was unable to prove that imposing criminal punishments
for posting harmful content was the least restrictive means available to shield minors from explicit materials online. 35 In fact, the
Supreme Court observed that blocking and filtering software could
provide a more effective means of reaching the government's de36
sired end.

30. Id. at 849, 852 (quoting Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842
(E.D. Pa. 1996)).
31. See Jacques, supra note 26, at 1986-88.
32. See Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 659-60 (2004).
33.
34.

Id. at 661; 47 U.S.C. § 231(a) (1998).
Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666.

35.

Id.

36.

Id. at 666-67.
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Ultimately, although many people generally consider childhood
exposure to explicit materials online inappropriate and potentially
harmful, the Supreme Court is not willing to allow Congress to create suppressive barriers between internet-using adults and content
that those adults have a constitutional right to receive and disperse.
Obviously, in these early online speech decisions dealing with pornography, the Supreme Court conveyed the important message that
protecting online content is a necessity rooted in American tradition, even if some consider the content improper or unimportant.
B.

Protectionof Sex Offenders'Access to Social Media

In addition to statutes aimed at protecting children from sexually
explicit materials online, states have introduced legislation regulating sex offenders' access to social media websites with the goal of
shielding minors from potential sexual abuse. 37 Following its precedent recognizing the importance of online communication, the Supreme Court once again concluded that the importance of online
communication greatly outweighed any potential government inter38

est.

In Packingham v. North Carolina,the Supreme Court was petitioned to determine the constitutionality of a North Carolina "statute making it a felony for a registered sex offender to gain access to
a number of websites, including commonplace social media websites
like Facebook and Twitter. ' 39 Ultimately, the Court declared North
Carolina's statute unconstitutional because foreclosing "access to
social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the
legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights." 40 In its analysis,
the Court recognized the importance of access to and the value of
social media in modern society by noting, "North Carolina with one
broad stroke bars access to what for many are the principal sources
for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking
and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring
the vast realms of human thought and knowledge. '41 The Supreme
Court, in deciding that North Carolina's legislation was invalid under the First Amendment, not only acknowledged every U.S. citizen's right to access and openly post on social media websites, but
42
also once again defended internet freedoms.
37.
38.

See, e.g., Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (2017).
See id. at 1737.

39.
40.

Id. at 1733.
Id. at 1737.

41.
42.

Id.
See id.
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The Few Limitations on Online Speech

While the Supreme Court of the United States has vehemently
championed the right to liberally communicate online, U.S. citizens
cannot escape the fact that "[c]ertain speech may be limited by the
government, regardless of the type of forum. 4 3 For example, the
Supreme Court has held that the government may regulate words
that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace," 44 also known as fighting words, when
the government is attempting to avoid a breach of peace and where
its regulations have been narrowly tailored. 45 In deciding that the
limitation on fighting words poses no Constitutional problem, the
Court noted that such expressions "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas. '' 46 Because fighting words serve no valuable purpose for society, the Court would also permit their regulation on the
internet.
Furthermore, when specifically dealing with issues revolving
around the World Wide Web, the Supreme Court has also approved
certain online speech restrictions that had previously only been applied to traditional methods of speech. In Reno, although the Court
primarily found that the First Amendment prohibited unnecessarily burdensome restrictions on sexually explicit materials on the
internet, the Court did acknowledge that the free speech rights of
adult netizens 47 can be limited and explained that "sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First
Amendment. ' 48 Before holding that obscene material on the internet can be governmentally barred, the Court previously prevented
obscene expression from being shielded under the First Amendment's protective umbrella in a case dealing with the mailing of
lewd materials. 49 Although the Court has expressly barred obscene
speech, which has generally been defined as expression that appeals to the prurient interest in sex, is patently offensive according
50
to contemporary community standards, and lacks social value, it
43.

Shikha Parikh, Your Right to Speak on Government Sponsored Social Media Sites,

50 MD. B. J. 14, 18 (2017).

44.
45.

Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
Parikh, supra note 43.

46.

Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 572.

47. Netizen, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/netizen
(last visited Mar. 30, 2018) ("Netizen" is a term meaning "an active participant in the online
community of the Internet.").
48. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (quoting Sable Commc'ns
of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns. Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
49.

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 493 (1957).

50.

See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18, 20-21 (1973).

178

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 57

seems that the Court has painted its restrictions on obscenity with
an extremely broad brush, given that it has protected, on multiple
51
occasions, sexually explicit materials online.
Additionally, although true threats, or statements meant to
''communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals," 52 were previously disqualified for constitutional protections
53
only when dispersed through more traditional methods of speech,
the Supreme Court reiterated this sentiment for true threats on the
internet. 54 However, the Supreme Court did create a caveat to the
prohibition of threatening language when deciding whether graphically violent rap lyrics posted online fit the definition of a true
threat as opposed to an artistic expression. 55 In determining that
the at-issue rap lyrics did not qualify as true threats, the Court
noted that the speaker must have "knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat. ' 56 Accordingly, although internet
speech is generally protected in the United States, traditional limitations on free speech have been applied to the internet by the Supreme Court that allow governmental restrictions on certain types
'57
of "nonspeech.

III.

THE GREAT FIREWALL: ONLINE SPEECH REGULATION IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

As the Cultural Revolution 58 came to an end after the death of
Communist leader Mao Zedong, China began to slowly unlock its
doors and open itself up to the outside world. 59 As a part of its effort
51. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004); Reno, 521
U.S. at 872; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S 234, 258 (2002) (holding that two
provisions of the Child Pornography Act of 1996 were unconstitutional because the provisions' vague language allowed for the prohibition of materials that were neither obscenely
nor illegally depicting children in a sexually exploitative manner).
52. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
53.
54.

See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2011 (2015).

55.

See id. at 2017.

56.

Id. at 2012.

57.
58.

Parikh, supra note 43.
Thomas Phillips, The Cultural Revolution: All You Need to Know About China's Po-

litical

Convulsion,

GUARDIAN

(May

10,

2016),

https://www.theguard-

ian.com/world/2016/may/ 1/the-cultural-revolution-50-years-on-all-you-need-to-knowabout-chinas-political-convulsion (The Cultural Revolution was a sociopolitical movement in
China headed by Mao Zedong that took place in the 1960s and isolated China from the outside world. Although this movement ultimately failed, the goal of the campaign was to rid
China of its past, defeat capitalism's presence in China, and ensure a socialist society.).
59. Yutian Ling, UpholdingFree Speech and Privacy Online:A Legal-Based and MarketBased Approach for Internet Companies in China, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 175, 176 (2011).
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to move away from an isolationist past, China established its first
international internet connection in 1994.60 Although access to the
global internet in China seemed like a liberating opportunity for
China's citizens to communicate with the world beyond its borders,
the Chinese government, realizing the World Wide Web's capability
to instantaneously circulate ideas and information, sought to control its potential for spreading political unrest amongst its popula61
tion.
According to recent data, internet use in China is at an all-time
high, with 731 million Chinese citizens logging on in 2017.62 This
extremely high rate of online activity in the People's Republic of
China (PRC), 63 however, is sharply juxtaposed with China's extremely stringent regulation of the internet, which leaves its over
half a billion internet-using citizens with little room to freely connect with others in cyberspace. 64 In fact, in recent times, "China
has emerged as the main offender in Internet censorship" using
what is dubbed its "Great Firewall of China" to block any "unhappy
information" and enforcing severe penalties for internet users who
65
violate censorship laws.
A.

Legal Restriction, Technological Regulation, and Scare Tactics: The Building Blocks of China's Great Firewall
Similar to that of the United States, the Constitution of the Peo-

ple's Republic of China provides that "Citizens ...enjoy freedom of

speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and
of demonstration. '66 However, despite its promise to allow the Chinese population to communicate freely, the Chinese government began taking steps to silence internet dissenters against the Communist Party of China (CPC), prevent excessive outside influence,

60.
61.

Id.
See Simon Denyer, China's Scary Lesson to the World: Censoring the Internet Works,

WASH. POST (May 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/chinas-

scary-lesson-to-the-world-censoring-the-internet-works/20 16/05/23/413afe 78-fff3-1 1e5-8bb 1f124a43f84dc story.html?utmterm=.a45937212e0d.
62. Steven Millward, China Now Has 731 Million Internet Users, 95% Access from Their
Phones, TECH IN ASIA (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.techinasia.com/china-731-million-inter-

net-users-end-2016.
63. See id.
64. See Denyer, supra note 61.
65. Shyu, supra note 10, at 225, 227.
66. Constitution of The People's Republic of China, 1982, U. S. CAL. US-CHINA INST.,

http://china.usc.edu/constitution-peoples-republic-china-1982#chap3
2017).

(last visited Nov. 2,
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and generally control online content almost immediately after it en67
tered the global network by building the Great Firewall of China.
In 1996, only two short years after establishing its international
internet connection, China's State Council laid the foundation for
the Great Firewall by promulgating the "Interim Provisions Governing the Management of Computer Information Networks" (1996
Provisions).68 In these provisions, the Chinese government regulated the liberal exchange of online materials by criminalizing the
disclosure of state secrets, prohibiting the transmission of sexually
suggestive material, and forbidding the dissemination of information that could harm the government or social stability.6 9 However, these provisions, along with many other similar regulations,
catalogue what qualifies as forbidden material in a manner that is
"so vague as to encompass potentially anything," 70 leaving Chinese
internet users somewhat uncertain about what they can and cannot
share online.
Chinese leaders have also relied heavily on the assistance of
party and governmental agencies, whose regulation of the internet
is crucial to the restriction of China's cyberspace and the impenetrability of China's Great Firewall. Essentially, these "agencies
control both who is able to post content on the Internet ... and what
content is posted," 71 and include the Ministry of Public Security,
which filters and monitors the internet, the General Administration
of Press and Publication, which "has the legal authority to screen,
censor, and ban any ... Internet publication in China," and other
organizations. 72 Perhaps most shockingly, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) "controls the licensing and registration of all
'Internet information services' (sometimes translated as 'Internet
content providers'), which are defined to include anyone providing
information to the public via the Internet. '73 In effect, the MII is
"pre-approving who gets to speak and who does not" 74 and is ultimately quelling free speech and exchange on the World Wide Web.
For instance, in exercising its powers, the MII, along with the help
67. See Kissel, supra note 9, at 230 (noting that the Chinese government created many
regulations during the first decade of the Internet's existence in China to maintain "ideological unanimity" and enforce "[s]tate control of all information flows" on the World Wide Web).
68. Id. at 234.
69. Id.
70. Ling, supra note 59, at 183.
71. Id. at 181.
72. Agencies Responsible for Censorship in China, CONG.-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON

CHINA, https://www.cecc. gov/agencies-responsible-for-censorship-in-china (last visited Nov.
2, 2017).

73.

Id.

74.

Ling, supra note 59, at 182.
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of the Chinese State Council, has effectively restricted the online
administration of "[n]ews," which it broadly defines as anything relating to politics, military or foreign affairs, economics, social
events, and social or public affairs.7 5 Essentially, by promulgating
the Administration of News regulations, the M11 has successfully
restricted anything that could be classified as "news" and has limited what information Chinese citizens receive about current affairs
to solely what is approved and disseminated by the Chinese government and its cooperating agencies.76 As an example of the Administration of News regulations' impact on online news dissemination,
if Chinese internet users were to attempt to find information about
the well-known Tiananmen Square Massacre that took place in Beijing in 1989, their efforts would be practically fruitless. 7 7 In fact,
because the Chinese government continuously censors online news,
it has been able to prevent people from talking about this subject
online and preclude many youths from knowing the event took place
78
at all.
Additionally, in order to gain even greater control over internet
content, the CPC began to regulate the technology that provides the
PRC with access to the internet. For example, in 2000, the CPC
promulgated the Measures for Managing Internet Information Services (2000 Measures), which required internet service providers
(ISPs) "to record the dates and times when subscribers accessed the
Internet, the subscriber's account number, the addresses of all websites visited, and the telephone number used to access the Internet. '79 By requiring the companies that provide internet access to
document the activity of internet users, the 2000 Measures not only
impose liability on ISPs and internet content providers, but also incite fear in internet users who want to avoid criminal and monetary
penalties, possibly preventing them from speaking and searching
freely online.8 0 Furthermore, the 2000 Measures expanded on the
four restrictions set forth in the aforementioned 1996 Provisions by
also disallowing an additional five broad categories of information
on the internet, including anything that "undermines national
unity."81 Once again, these vague restrictions blur the lines of what
75. Kissel, supra note 9, at 238-39.
76. See id. at 237-40.
77. See id. at 246.
78. See Christopher Beam, "IThink It's Already Been Forgotten" How China's Millennials Talk About Tiananmen Square, NEW REPUBLIC (June 3, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117983/tiananmen-square-massacre-how-chinas-millennials-discuss-it-now.
79. Kissel, supra note 9, at 235.
80. See id. at 231, 240.
81. Id. at 235.

182

Vol. 57

Duquesne Law Review

is and is not permissible on the web and further stifle Chinese
netizens' online posts.
More recently, in late August 2017, the Cyberspace Administration of China, another government agency controlling the internet
82
in China, administered new rules targeting online commenters.
These rules have stripped Chinese netizens of any semblance of
online anonymity, requiring "internet forum providers .

.

. to force

their users to register using their real names," which must also be
verified.8 3 By preventing online users from hiding their identity behind a username, the CPC has stifled online speech by making it
easier for the government to discover who is behind certain online
comments and posts.
Despite all of these building blocks that make up the Great Firewall, both Chinese citizens and travelers are able to circumvent the
internet barrier through the use of virtual private networks, more
commonly referred to as "VPNs. 8' 4 Essentially, "[a] VPN works by
'tunneling' your internet traffic onto a private network before sending it out onto the public internet," making it seem like the internet
user is accessing the internet from Los Angeles or London instead
of mainland China and allowing that individual to access information and websites typically blocked and post about topics disallowed on the PRC's internet.8 5 Although VPNs have been used in
China for many years, the CPC began its crackdown on this technological hole in the Great Firewall and has ordered the three top
ISPs in China to completely bar the use of VPNs on their networks
by February 2018.86 This latest technological directive issued by
the government will prevent netizens in China from accessing information unfavorable to the CPC, but it will also further prevent
them from engaging in dialogue with members of the international
internet community.
By employing agencies to filter internet content and information,
having nearly complete control of providers of internet access, and
creating criminal and monetary penalties for violating extremely
ambiguous regulation, both China's government and its major political party have continued to build an increasingly stronger and
82.

David Meyer, China Tightens the Noose on Free Online Speech, Again, FORTUNE

(Aug. 28, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/28/china-real-names-online-anonymity-censor-

ship/.
83.
84.
(July
down/.
85.
86.

Id.
See Echo Huang, What You Need to Know About China's VPN Crackdown, QUARTZ
12, 2017), https://qz.com/1026064/what-you-need-to-know-about-chinas-vpn-crackSee id.
Id.
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impressive, multi-layered system of blocking and controlling internet content to prevent "information harmful to the Communist
Party from entering the country."8 7 Additionally, because China's
government has successfully crafted the "largest internet censorship regime in the world," it has also achieved the aim of stifling
speech and exchange.8 8 Simply put, because "[b]road, vague, and
conflicting legislation hangs over Chinese citizens like a fog, obscuring the boundaries of free speech . . .most people are too wary to

approach them for fear of over stepping them."8 9 Despite the assurances of free speech rights in China's Constitution, Chinese citizens
and foreign visitors logging on to the World Wide Web in the PRC
are legally and technologically prevented from accessing certain
content and may be intimidated by the harsh consequences threatened for violating China's confusing and severe restrictions on the
internet.
IV.

PRESENT DIFFERENCES IN INTERNET EXPRESSION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CHINA: IS AN INTERNET REGIME SIMILAR TO
THAT OF CHINA POSSIBLE IN THE UNITED STATES?

Although both the United States and China have similar language regarding freedom of speech in their respective Constitutions, these countries' methods of internet speech regulation are
currently enormously different. "The critical difference between the
Chinese model and the United States model is this: the Chinese legal basis for controlling the Internet is vague and general, while the
United States' is specific and narrow." 90 In the United States, while
there are numerous limits on free speech, the Supreme Court, acting as the interpreter and protector of the United States Constitution, has only allowed the federal government or state governments
to proscribe speech in the direst of circumstances, such as when a
child is sexually exploited, or when there is a legitimate threat
posed to others. 91 In the name of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has generally rejected any law that would have a
chilling effect on the sharing of ideas, artistic expression, and other
87.

Denyer, supra note 61.

88. Benjamin Haas, China Moves to Block Internet VPNs From 2018, GUARDIAN (July
11, 2017, 12:33 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/11/china-moves-to-blockinternet-vpns-from-2018.
89.

Prior Restraints, CONG.-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, https://www.cecc.gov/

prior-restraints (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
90. Jeffrey (Chien-Fei) Li, Internet Control or Internet Censorship? Comparing the Models of China, Singapore,and the United States to Guide Taiwan's Choice, 14 U. PITT. J. TECH.
L. & POL'Y 1, 24 (2013).

91.

See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004 (2015).

184

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 57

types of valuable discourse, even if they may be considered taboo,
hateful, downright worthless to certain members of the population,
92
or even critical of the U.S. government.
In China, on the other hand, while the Chinese Constitution
boasts freedom of speech for all Chinese citizens, the government
and the major political party have utilized legislative restriction
and technological control to build a tremendous internet barrier,
enclosing Chinese citizens in their own online bubble free from political chat and other types of discourse with one another and the
outside world. Perhaps most importantly in the modern world, unlike the Supreme Court of the United States in Packingham v.
North Carolina,China's leaders saw no value in the use of popular
worldwide social media engines like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, viewing these sites as a threat to Chinese national unity, effectively blocking them, and creating Chinese copycats of these
93
sites, such as RenRen and Sina Weibo.
As it stands currently, it seems that the most recognizable difference between American and Chinese regulation of internet speech
lies in the motives of the two countries when limiting the sharing of
online content. In the United States, when the legislative or executive branches of government attempt to suppress online communication, the judiciary intervenes to protect the highly-revered First
Amendment and only allows limitation on speech when absolutely
necessary. 94 In contrast, in the PRC, the government, with the help
of agencies and other party officials, has not only taken legal control
of the internet, but has also dominated the technological existence
of cyberspace for the goal of preventing resistance against the CPC
and to achieve cyber sovereignty.
V.
PRESIDENT TRUMP'S RECENT ATTACKS ON INTERNET
SPEECH: WILL THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION CREATE THE GREAT
FIREWALL OF AMERICA?
The forty-fifth President of the United States, Donald Trump, is
an extremely avid user of online social media sources and is well-

92.

See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997).

93. See Eric Savitz, 5 Things You Need To Know About Chinese Social Media, FORBES
(Oct. 25, 2012, 2:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2 0 12/10/25/5-things-youneed-to-know-about-chinese-social-media/#4e95d5b019f0 (RenRen is said to be equivalent to
Facebook, while Weibo is often compared to Twitter).
94. See, e.g., Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
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known for his presence on Twitter. 95 In fact, President Trump credited the existence of social media for his victory in the 2016 presidential election. 96 Despite his reliance on the internet as a platform
to inform the American populace about current events, President
Donald Trump has, on multiple occasions, condemned internet
speech and suggested that the government gain more control over
internet activity in the United States, which could lead to a cyberspace similar to that of the PRC. Given President Trump's statements, is it possible that the Trump administration could execute
his plan to "close that internet up ' 97 and sustain a China-like internet regime in the United States? Additionally, would this internet
censorship even be possible, considering the First Amendment's
stronghold in American culture and the Supreme Court's fervent
protection of online speech?
The following sections of this article will explore President
Trump's attempts to stifle online internet speech through methods
that mirror the building blocks used by the Chinese government in
its construction of the Great Firewall: scare tactics and technological regulation. It will also discuss how the Trump administration,
much like the CPC, has sought to prevent online criticism of the
U.S. government, specifically on Twitter. After discussing President Trump's previous actions, this article will discuss whether
Trump's former efforts or the invocation of a looming legal measure
could potentially lead to the end of a free and open American internet. Ultimately, the following sections will consider Trump's past
actions and possible future conduct to determine whether the construction of a "Great Firewall" of America is a possibility.

95. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump?ref src=twsrco5Egoogle7Ctwcampo5Eserpo7Ctwgro5Eauthor (last visited Feb. 14, 2018); see also Nolan D. McCaskill, Trump Credits Social Media for his Election,
POLITICO (Oct. 20, 2017, 7:05 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/20/trump-socialmedia-election-244009.
96. McCaskill, supra note 95; see also generally Read the Social Media Posts Russians
Allegedly Used to Influence 2016 Election Cycle, CBS NEWS (Feb. 16, 2018, 7:47 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/read-social-media-posts-russians-allegedly-used-to-influence-the-election/. In addition to President Trump's active online presence, there are also
allegations that Russia contributed to President Trump's victory by manipulating America
social media and launching online campaigns "supporting the presidential campaign of thencandidate Donald J. Trump and disparaging Hillary Clinton." Id.
97.

Lawson, supra note 11.
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President Trump's Various Attempts to Stifle Online Speech
1.

Using Scare Tactics to Start the Censorship Conversation

Soon after Donald Trump hit the campaign trail during the 2016
presidential election, he began to condemn the open nature of the
World Wide Web, utilizing terrorist groups' exploitation of online
communication to begin discussing the need for internet restriction. 98 First, in December 2015 at a campaign rally in South
Carolina, Trump spoke to potential voters about ISIS's99 use of
online forums to recruit members to its terrorist organization and
suggested "closing that Internet up in some way." 100 Trump went
on to add, "Somebody will say, 'Oh, freedom of speech, freedom of
speech.' These are foolish people." 10 1 Although Trump's goals for
internet censorship at the time he made these comments seemed to
be aimed at preventing the advancement of terrorism and protecting U.S. citizens, an aim attractive to many Americans, these negative comments about freedom of speech in cyberspace were unprecedented, considering that "no other presidential candidate or intelligence official has advocated for 'closing' the Internet ....
2
Additionally, after winning the election, President Trump continued to criticize the expansiveness of the internet by, once again,
commenting on the link between recruitment in terrorist organizations and the World Wide Web. 10 3 On September 15, 2017 after an
act of terrorism in London, President Trump used his Twitter account to broadcast to millions of followers that "[1loser terrorists
must be dealt with in a much tougher manner. The internet is their
main recruitment tool which we must cut off & use better!"10 4 In
response to this post, many Twitter users showed concern about interference with internet freedom, with one person replying, "'Cut
the internet'? The insulation is dangerous" 10 5 and another commenting, "You want to cut off the internet?! The Great Firewall of
98. See Keith Wagstaff, Donald Trump Calls For 'Closing that Internet Up', NBC NEWS
(Dec. 8, 2015, 10:53 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/donald-trump-calls-closing-internet-n476156.

99.

Isis is a "powerful terrorist militant group that has seized control of large areas of

the Middle East." ISIS, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/isis (last updated Aug. 21,
2018)
100. Wagstaff, supra note 98.

101.

Id.

102. Id.
103. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 15, 2017, 3:48 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/908643633901039617.

104. Id.
105. Andreas Augenthaler (@DFBbear), TWITTER (Sept. 18, 2017, 9:18 AM), https://twitter.com/DFBbear/status/909813887352090624.
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the US?"106 Indeed, President Trump's comments even alarmed and
garnered opposition from experts in cybersecurity, such as Timothy
Edgar, Director of Law and Policy at Brown University's Executive
Master in Cybersecurity program. 10 7 According to Edgar, "we need
to take seriously Trump's statements and what they might portend
for the future of internet security and privacy. 10 8 Although President Trump's commentary about the internet may seem like frustrated reactions to the use of online communication tools to further
terrorist objectives, these comments also present a cause for concern for many American netizens accustomed to a culture that encourages free internet speech.
2.

Defeating Net Neutrality

Within days of his inauguration, Trump began his mission to end
net neutrality in the United States, which was originally created to
"safeguard free expression online" and preserve the ability to speak
freely on an open internet. 10 9 Essentially, the net neutrality rules
created under the Obama administration prevented providers of internet services from blocking content, changing internet speeds for
certain websites, or doing anything else that would inhibit the use
of the internet. 110
In his first official move to abolish net neutrality rules, President
Trump appointed Ajit Pai, "a critic of net neutrality ... to chairman
of the Federal Communications Commission, the agency responsible for enforcing those regulations," on January 23, 2017.111 Later,
in the spring of 2017, President Trump furthered his desire to end
net neutrality by signing a bill "releasing internet service providers
... from having to protect consumer data, in effect jeopardizing people's privacy and opening them up to surveillance." 112 Finally, on

106. Cathy Flusche (@cathy-flusche), TWITTER (Sept. 15, 2017, 9:04 AM), https:Iltwitter.com/cathy-flusche/status/909810346906570752.

107. See Lawson, supra note 11.
108. Id.
109. Steve Lohr, Net Neutrality Is Trump's Next Target, AdministrationSays, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/technology/net-neutrality.html (Net
neutrality was established to "preserve the open internet and ensure that it could not be
divided into pay-to-play fast lanes for web and media companies that can afford it and slow
lanes for everyone else.").
110. See id.
111. Tim Stelloh, Trump Promotes Neutrality OpponentAjit Pai to Lead FCC, NBC NEWS
(Jan. 23, 2017, 8:40 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/trump-promotes-neutrality-opponent-ajit-pai-lead-fcc-n71II16.
112. Roni Jacobson, Internet Censorship is Advancing Under Trump, WIRED (Apr. 12,
2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/internet-censorship-is-advancing-undertrump/; see also S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted).
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December 14, 2017, President Trump's promotion of Ajit Pai resulted in the achievement of his goal to end net neutrality in the
United States when the Federal Communications Commission announced its decision to dismantle the net neutrality rules, "a step
critics warn will upend the internet by allowing cable companies to
control where their customers can go online" and to block certain
content. 113 This sequence of events, by rapidly demolishing the
rules that maintain Americans' ability to generally enjoy the uninhibited and open nature of the American internet platform, could
give internet service providers more leeway in regulating information and, in turn, affect Americans' daily internet use.
3.

Silencing Twitter Dissenters

In addition to speaking openly about closing the internet and being at the forefront of net neutrality's demise, President Trump and
his administration have also attacked free speech online by both
attempting to uncover the identity of certain Twitter dissenters and
blocking Trump's critics. In April 2017, around the same time President Trump signed the bill releasing ISPs from protecting internet
user data, Twitter sued the United States Department of Homeland
Security after it demanded Twitter reveal the identities of those behind an anti-Trump account. 114 The account, @ALT_USCIS, which
is run by ex-government employees dissatisfied with the Trump administration, "broke no laws and only used Twitter to voice dissent. ' 115 Not long after the suit was filed, news sources published
stories on the case, and the government quickly revoked its request
116
to learn the names of the oppositional Twitter users.
Only a few months later, President Trump and members of his
administration with access to his social media accounts, once again,
attempted to silence online dissention by blocking those openly
challenging his politics on Twitter. 117 In response, seven Twitter

113. Margaret Harding McGill, FCC Votes to Repeal Net Neutrality Rules, POLITICO (Dec.
14, 2017, 1:16 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/14/fcc-votes-to-repeal-net-neutrality-rules-295500; see also FCC Acts to Restore Internet Freedom, 2017 WL 6405704, at *1

(Dec. 14, 2017) (announcing the FCC's decision to reverse the "FCC's 2015 heavy-handed
utility-style regulation of broadband Internet access service, which imposed substantial costs
on the entire Internet ecosystem.").

114.
115.

Jacobson, supra note 112.
Id.

116.

Id.

117. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Knight First Amendment
Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:17-cv-05205), 2017 WL 2952634,
at *1.
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users and the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
against President Trump, White House Press Secretary Sean
18
Spicer, and White House Director of Social Media Daniel Scavino.
According to the complaint, President Trump's effort to quell any
opposition by blocking the Plaintiffs on Twitter "violates the First
Amendment because it imposes a viewpoint-based restriction on the
Individual Plaintiffs' participation in a public forum," "access to official statements the President otherwise makes available to the
general public," and their "ability to petition the government for redress of grievances. 1 19
Although President Trump's previous commentary and attacks
on net neutrality amounted to indirect and circuitous maneuvers to
begin shutting the door on an unrestrained cyberspace, the Trump
administration's actions toward Twitter users marked a direct
strike on the ability of the American public to disagree with the
President's political ideology on social media platforms. This sort
of targeted vendetta against unfavorable political speech notably
parallels the actions taken by the Chinese government on its path
to create a barrier between its people and online opposition. Because President Trump is taking steps to eliminate online dissent
that mimic the premier internet censor's journey to the Great Firewall of China, his actions on Twitter should raise red flags about
potential First Amendment implications, especially in a nation that
so readily sanctifies open exchange and political expression.
B.

Will President Trump's Actions Against the Internet and its
Users Lead to an Unprecedented Weakening of FirstAmendment Rights?
1.

The Demise of Net Neutrality: Will it Really Affect Free
Speech?

Although an internet filtered and blocked by the government may
seem distant and impossible, considering cyberspace's role in the
daily lives of Americans, the Trump administration's participation
in ending net neutrality was the catalyst for possible oppression of
free internet exchange in the United States. Because net neutrality
rules have prevented ISPs from analyzing or manipulating the data
internet users are sending or receiving, the destruction of those
118.

Id.

119.

Id. at 24.
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rules means that ISPs may now block traffic to certain websites,
slow down internet speeds to hasten access to particular information, and show preference to favorable materials online. 120 In
showing the importance of net neutrality to open online communication, the American Civil Liberties Union noted that net neutrality
is "one of the foremost free speech issues of our time" because "freedom of expression isn't worth much if the forums where people ac'12 1
tually make use of it are not themselves free.
By promoting Ajit Pai and successfully ending net neutrality, the
Trump administration has also approved many measures similar to
the legal provisions already existing in the PRC. For instance, although the bill signed by President Trump in spring of 2017 does not
require ISPs to document the internet activity of every user, it is
similar to the 2000 Measures in that it strips internet users of privacy online. Furthermore, by ending net neutrality, ISPs will have
similar abilities as those in the PRC to filter and block content in
cyberspace. Overall, even though "[t]hese developments don't on
their own spell internet censorship .... they lay the groundwork for
it"122 and could rapidly cause certain online content in America to
be freely policed by ISPs.
2.

Knight FirstAmendment Institute v. Trump: First
Amendment Protectionfor Dissent on Social Media

Although President Trump uses Twitter as a tool to connect with
the American public, he has also used the capabilities of the social
media site to control the people and the comments associated with
his username. By blocking and attempting to uncover the identities
behind the usernames of individuals who disagree with his policies,
viewpoints, and tweets, President Trump's actions have threatened
the First Amendment right to speak freely about political topics and
to criticize the government.
In May 2018, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York ruled on the issue of President Trump blocking
dissenting members of the American public on Twitter, and in accordance with previous Supreme Court rulings, the Court safeguarded the First Amendment. 123 In doing so, the court considered
two questions: "whether a public official may, consistent with the
120. See What is Net Neutrality?, AM. C.L. UNION, https://www.aclu.org/issues/freespeech/internet-speech/what-net-neutrality (last updated Dec. 2017).
121.
122.

Id.
Jacobson, supra note 112.

123.

See Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 580 (S.D.N.Y.

2018).
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First Amendment, 'block' a person from his Twitter account in response to the political views that person has expressed, and
whether the analysis differs because that public official is the President of the United States. ' 12 4 The court held that "[t]he answer to
both questions is no. 12 5
In reaching its conclusion, the court conducted a multi-step inquiry, which started by deciding 'whether' the speech in which the
individual plaintiffs seek to engage 'is speech protected by the First
Amendment."'' 126 In answering this threshold issue, the court easily
determined that the plaintiffs' desired speech fell within the ambits
of First Amendment protection because it did not include a category
of unprotected speech (such as obscenity, defamation, etc.) and because the Supreme Court has previously decided that political
127
speech is protected by the First Amendment.
Next, the court decided whether President Trump's Twitter was
a public forum susceptible to forum analysis, 128 an issue projected
to be crucial to the Southern District of New York's decision before
arguments were heard. 129 Generally speaking, "forum analysis applies ... in the context of protecting the First Amendment right of
the public to speak or conduct expressive activities in certain areas
of the public domain."13 0 Because forum analysis applies solely to
spaces dedicated to public discourse, the court rejected the notion
that the entirety of President Trump's Twitter could be subject to
forum analysis and limited the spaces of his Twitter account that
could be considered.1 31 Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald, writing for
the court, specified:

124.
125.

Id. at 549.
Id.

126.

Id. at 564 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.

788, 797 (1985)).
127. Id. at 564-65.

128. Id. at 565.
129. See Laura Sydell, FirstAmendment Advocates Charge Trump Can't Block Critics On
Twitter, NPR (Nov. 7, 2017, 4:54 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/20 17/11/07/562619874/first-amendment-advocates-charge-trump-cant-block-critics-ontwitter (noting that legal professionals have pointed out that if President Trump's Twitter
account is considered a public forum and not a private account, the President may not exclude
someone from engaging in speech based on viewpoint); see also Brian P. Kane, Social Media
is the New Town Square: The Difficulty in Blocking Access to Public Official Accounts, 60
ADVOCATE 31, 32 (2017) (highlighting the importance of distinguishing whether a public official's social media accounts are used for personal or official purposes in determining
whether the public official may block followers or commenters).
130. Carl E. Brody, Jr., Consideringthe Public Forum Status of Government Internet Sites,
44 STETSON L. REV. 389, 392 (2015).
131. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566.
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Plaintiffs do not seek access to the account as a whole-they do
not desire the ability to send tweets as the President, the ability to receive notifications that the President would receive, or
the ability to decide who the President follows on Twitter. Because the access they seek is far narrower, we consider whether
forum doctrine can be appropriately applied to several aspects
of the @realDonaldTrump account rather than the account as
a whole: the content of the tweets sent, the timeline comprised of
those tweets, the comment threads initiated by each of those
tweets, and the 'interactivespace'associatedwith each tweet in
which other users may directly interact with the content of the
tweets by, for example, replying to, retweeting, or liking the
132
tweet.
After narrowing the aspects of the @realDonaldTrump Twitter
account that could be considered for forum analysis, the court then
turned its focus to whether "the space in question [is] . . . owned or
controlled by the government," a necessary prerequisite to applying
forum analysis. 13 3 Ultimately, because the President and his staff
have control over many aspects of the @realDonaldTrump account
135
at issue, 134 and the account is presented as a presidential account,
the court determined that "the governmental-control prong of the
analysis is met. ' 136 However, the court noted that the governmentcontrolled aspects of the President's account only included "the content of the tweets sent by @realDonaldTrump, the @realDonaldTrump timeline, and the interactive space associated with
each tweet" and did not include the comment threads. 13 7 The court

132.

Id. (emphasis added).

133.

Id.

134. See id. at 566-67 (noting that the President's Twitter is government-controlled although Twitter is not a government-owned company because "the President and Scavino
[White House Director of Social Media] ... exercise control over various aspects of the @realDonaldTrump account: they control the content of the tweets that are sent from the account
and they hold the ability to prevent, through blocking, other Twitter users, including the
individual plaintiffs here, from accessing the @realDonaldTrump timeline (while logged into
the blocked account) and from participating in the interactive space associated with
the tweets sent by the @realDonaldTrump account.").
135. See id. at 567 (establishing that President Trump's Twitter is governmental because
"(1) that the @realDonaldTrump account is presented as being 'registered to Donald J.
Trump, "45th President of the United States of America ... "'; (2) 'that the President's tweets
from @realDonaldTrump ... are official records that must be preserved under the Presidential Records Act'; and (3) that the @realDonaldTrump account has been used in the course of
the appointment of officers (including cabinet secretaries), the removal of officers, and the
conduct of foreign policy .
) (citations omitted).
136.
137.

Id. at 566.
Id. at 570.
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noted that the comment threads of tweets were distinguishable because while the President and his staff could "control the interactive space by limiting who may directly reply or retweet a tweet
initially sent by the @realDonaldTrump account, they lack comparable control over the subsequent dialogue in the comment
thread. 13 8 Additionally, the blocked accounts could still view and
respond to replies in the comment threads of the @realDonaldTrump account's tweets, which also indicates a lack of gov13 9
ernment control over comment threads.
After deciding which spaces were government-controlled, the
court "assess[ed] whether application of forum analysis is consistent with the purpose, structure, and intended use of the three
aspects of the @realDonaldTrump account that ... satisfy the gov-

ernment control-or- ownership criterion."1 40 Ultimately, because
the government speaking on its own behalf falls outside forum analysis, the court decided that the content of the President's tweets
was not susceptible to forum analysis because the tweets "are solely
the speech of the President or of other government officials. 14 1 Accordingly, the timeline, which simply works to aggregate the content of all the President's tweets, was also considered government
speech by the court, and therefore, was also not susceptible to forum
analysis.1 42 However, the court did not consider the interactive
space of the President's tweets to be government speech because
any Twitter user who was not blocked by the @realDonaldTrump
account could interact and engage with the content of the tweet by
replying, retweeting, and liking the tweet. 143 Therefore, the interactive space of the President's Twitter was the only feature the
14 4
court subjected to forum analysis.
To determine how to apply the forum analysis to the interactive
space of the @realDonaldTrump Twitter account, the court next had
to determine what type of public forum the interactive space could
be classified as. 145 The three types of fora for expressive activity
outlined by the court were (1) public fora traditionally devoted to
assembly and debate, (2) public property opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity, and (3) a nonpublic forum that
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is not by tradition or designation a place for public communication. 146 The court easily determined that the interactive space of a
tweet is not a traditional public forum because "there is simply no
extended historical practice as to the medium of Twitter."147 However, because the interactive space is accessible to the public at
large, and because anyone with a Twitter account can follow the
@realDonaldTrump account and reply to and retweet tweets unless
that individual has been blocked, the court concluded that the in148
teractive space is a designated public forum.
As the final step in its analysis, the court determined "whether
the blocking of the individual plaintiffs is permissible in a designated public forum." 149 Although regulation of a designated public
forum is permissible only if the limitations on the forum satisfy
strict scrutiny, the court noted that "[r]egardless of the specific nature of the forum

. .

. 'viewpoint discrimination... is presumed im-

permissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations.' ' 150 The Plaintiffs involved in this litigation were
blocked shortly after posting tweets that criticized the President
and his policies. 151 Because the President and his staff blocked individuals based on the political views expressed in their tweets, the
court concluded "that the blocking of the individual plaintiffs ... is

impermissible under the First Amendment." 152 Interestingly, after
concluding that blocking the Plaintiffs was unconstitutional, the
court noted that although the Plaintiffs harm was minimal because
they could still access the content of @realDonaldTrump account's
tweets and could reply to earlier replies to the President's tweets,
"the blocking of the individual plaintiffs has the discrete impact of
preventing them from interacting directly with the President's
tweets, thereby restricting a real, albeit narrow, slice of speech. No
'153
more is needed to violate the Constitution.
Although President Trump unblocked the seven Twitter users involved in the Knight case, the Trump administration decided to appeal the Southern District of New York's ruling to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit soon after Judge Naomi
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Reice Buchwald entered her opinion.154 Because the Supreme
Court has consistently defended political dissent, the Second Circuit will likely uphold the Southern District of New York's decision
in favor of the Plaintiffs due to the Trump administration's attempts to censor online opposition. However, it will be important
to watch how the Second Circuit analyzes the First Amendment issues in this case and to see if the Supreme Court ever grants certiorari for this case.
3.

Potential Legal Measures: The CommunicationsAct of
1934

In addition to blocking opponents on social media and abolishing
net neutrality, Timothy Edgar, an expert in cybersecurity, explains
another route that the Trump administration could pursue in at155
tempting to achieve the goal of "shut[ting] down" the internet.
He remarks:
If Trump decides to build a great firewall, he may not need
Congress. Section 606 of the Communications Act of 1934 provides emergency powers to seize control of communications facilities if the president declares there is a "war or threat of war"
or "a state of public peril." In 2010, a Senate report concluded
that section 606 "gives the President the authority to take over
wire communications in the United States and, if the President
so chooses, shut a network down." With a stroke of a pen,
Trump could invoke it.156
Although this provision has never been utilized by a commanderin-chief to dismantle the World Wide Web, there is nothing in the
statute that excludes the internet from its reach. 157 Furthermore,
Edgar also states that although First Amendment concerns may
arise from the use of this provision, threats of terrorism and danger
in wartime would likely be enough to trump any anxieties about
freedom of online speech. 158 Therefore, if any emergency situation
were to arise that could threaten the safety of the American public,
154.

Charlie Savage, White House Un blocks Twitter Users Who Sued Trump, But Appeals

Ruling, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/O6/O5/us/politics/trump-

twitter-account-lawsuit.ht ml.
155. Lawson, supra note 11.
156. Id.; 47 U.S.C. § 606(d) (1934) (stating that in times of war, if the President "deems it
necessary in the interest of the national security and defense," the President may "suspend
or amend the rules and regulations applicable to any or all facilities or stations for wire communication ... [and] cause the closing of any facility or station for wire communication.").
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it seems that President Donald Trump could possibly take yet another unprecedented action and invoke the Communications Act of
1934 as a building block of the possible Great Firewall of America.
VI.
CONCLUSION: THE STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS OF THE
CURRENT ADMINISTRATION SHOULD RAISE CONCERNS ABOUT THE
FUTURE OF FREE ONLINE SPEECH

Hundreds of years ago, President George Washington cautioned,
"[T]he freedom of [s]peech may be taken away-and, dumb [and]
silent we may be led, like sheep, to the [s]laughter."' 159 In the modern world, people have access to many innovative forums for speech,
including the internet, that have become the primary vehicle for
expression. Unfortunately, because of the internet's endless capabilities, it is incredibly vulnerable to exactly the type of governmental control that President Washington rebuked.
Since its dawn, numerous countries around the world have
worked to control cyberspace's capacity for instantaneous, uninhibited online dialogue in order to prevent dissent, promote national
unity, and to force the general populace to remain ignorant and silent. 16 0 China, the premier leader in internet censorship on the
world stage, has successfully mixed stringent legal and technological controls with psychological tactics in order to build its Great
Firewall of China, the barrier between Chinese citizens and the
ability to post and search freely on the World Wide Web. Although
such a barrier has never been a reality for the American people, the
current President of the United States has openly discussed and
has taken steps toward potentially preventing open exchange on
the internet and has even employed tactics similar to those used by
the Chinese government. Despite the First Amendment's strong
presence in American culture and in Supreme Court of the United
States' precedent, there still remains a possibility that the United
States internet scheme could be manipulated and that online
speech and access to content could be stifled. Although the Southern District of New York has recently ruled that the President is
legally unable to block people, his recent actions that promoted the
end of net neutrality and his wartime powers could potentially give
him the opportunity to start "closing that internet up. 16 1
159. National Gazette, MOUNTVERNON.ORG, http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/national-gazette/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2017).
160.
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Even though the threat to free internet speech in the United
States is not directly imminent, the American populace, which passionately defends and emphatically reveres the First Amendment,
should be aware of the current administration's initial successes in
demolishing online freedom and laying the foundation for a potential Great Firewall of America.

